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In the domain of law, and elsewhere, alternative dispute resolution can be used in
more than one way.  It may signify a recognition that there are other methods than
litigation, and that these may sometimes be more appropriate.  But it may also serve
as a label for methods which are frowned upon as popular but amateurish.  This
article is written from the perspective that the deep roots and valid reasons for tradi-
tional conflict resolution methods and customs should be taken seriously.  They
form part of time-proven social systems, in which the objective is usually more than
just settling a case.  Such methods, whether they include more adjudication or more
mediation, are especially oriented towards reconciliation and the maintenance or
even improvement of social relationships.  Representative examples from a few
South African societies are discussed, as well as the current situation of Western and
customary law, modern courts and tribal courts, legal professionals and traditional
leaders.  Possibilities for the future are pointed out, in an increasingly urbanised
South Africa, but a South Africa with a new Constitution.
methods of tribal courts resemble in some respect those of councillors in
our own society, they approximate more to the methods of our courts.  They
are authoritative.
(Gluckman 1965:187)
The importance of the process, therefore, lies in the goal it has set itself and that,
invariably, is to restore a balance, to settle conflict and eliminate disputes.
One of the most important features distinguishing between western and African
processes of dispute settlement is the manner in which the social relationships
between the parties involved in the respective processes are treated.  Nader and
Todd, referring to the analysis adopted by Gluckman, argue that these relationships
are either simplex or multiplex.  The relationship determines the procedural form of
the attempt at settlement and thus determines the outcome of the dispute (Nader &
Todd 1978:12-13).  The ensuing hypothesis is that the parameters of the settlement
process are determined by the nature of the relationships involved.  Accordingly,
multiplex relationships depend upon measures of negotiation or mediation to 
result in compromises, whereas simplex relationships depend upon adjudication or 
arbitration to end up in win or lose decisions (Nader & Todd 1978:13).
Save for the paradoxical situation in countries such as Japan, India and South Africa,
among others, where traditional approaches are extant and fundamental to the 
resolution of conflict, even within an industrialised urban setting, the position is
generally different in industrialised societies, according to various scholars (Nader
& Todd 1978:21).  Abel (1982:2) states that western capitalism rejects the values
placed on reputation in the face-to-face community .  Cappelletti castigates the
western orientation towards a rights culture, which looks upon judicial solutions or
contentious justice as an ideal, to the exclusion of other possibilities such as are
promoted in other civilisations, which he describes as coexistential justice
(Cappelletti 1992:34).  The parties in the latter situation are interested in mending
rather than terminating relationships (Cappelletti 1992:35).  In contrasting western
court processes of dispute settlement with those of African courts, Bennett notes that
the essence of the latter is a tendency to mediate or arbitrate rather than to adjudi-
cate.  Reconciliation of disputes was preferred and the impartial application of rules
was inevitably of less consequence (Bennett 1991b:54).
The closest that a conventional western-orientated court comes to such a process is
the stage when an order is taken by consent, usually at the end of protracted negoti-
ations in the course, or at the end of litigation.  The judge plays little, if any, role in
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It was my fortune to be well versed in the fundamentals of what is
called Native Law and Custom, so I was able to take up my court
work with no great difficulty.  But my main pleasure in this activity
came from the rewarding attempt to reconcile people who were at
variance, and from the debate involved.  I love the impact of mind
upon mind, and I love thrashing things out in the attempt to get at
the truth.  The procedures of the court give these things orderli-
ness, and getting at the truth is worth while for its own sake.  The
dying arts of exposition hold great attraction for me.
(Luthuli 1962:56)
1. Introduction
The use of alternative methods of conflict resolution by the traditional societies of
South Africa is deeply rooted in the customs and traditions of the various tribes of
the sub-continent.  These range from the fairly rudimentary processes of the
Khoisan of the remote Northern Cape to the sophisticated traditional courts of the
Zulu in KwaZulu-Natal.
Some methods of conflict resolution as practised by traditional societies of South
Africa, which are representative of the main tribal affiliations in the region, will be
considered here.  Reference will be made to the provisions of the Constitution and
Bill of Rights that will play an important role in the development of South African
jurisprudence, especially in respect to customary law, and to the central role of
chiefs and headmen in the conflict resolution process (Hammond-Tooke 1993:65).
2. Western and African court processes of dispute settlement
Bennett reflects on the judicial process in an African context and compares it with
its western counterpart.  The essence of the African process was reconciliation of the
parties in an environment quite the opposite of the western model, which seems
designed to alienate and confuse the litigant (Bennett 1993:32).  Gluckman, in
similar vein, points out that in the case of western judges there is some judicial inter-
vention in divorce cases and family disputes designed to getting the parties to settle
their differences.  He illustrates the point by referring to marriage guidance council-
lors who 
work on disputing parties as Lovedu and Tiv judges do, without authority to
lay down decisions or enforce verdicts .  For, in the end, though the
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The retention of jurisdiction by traditional courts, however truncated, over certain
matters is indicative of the entrenched position occupied by these courts in tradi-
tional society, and any alteration to the status quo would have been unwarranted in
the circumstances.  However, commissioners courts have now been abolished with
their judicial functions assumed by magistrates courts.  This reform has brought
with it other problems.  Bennett (1991b:82, note 11) points out that although all
courts in South Africa may apply customary law — 
Unfortunately these new powers were not complemented by the intimate
knowledge of African affairs which gave commissioners their special
expertise in African litigation.  In the circumstances, magistrates courts
cannot be described as accessible to African litigants.
4. Traditional courts and modern courts
In theory a party to a dispute could resist the intrusion of civil law especially where
a claim is founded on the traditions of a particular group.  However, this does not
mean that there would not be occasions where traditional norms will conflict with
those of civil society.  In that event it would be imprudent to predict the approach
that would be adopted by the Constitutional Court in treading its way through a veri-
table minefield, especially where gender equality and other sensitive issues are
involved.
The methods of conflict resolution employed in traditional courts are not unique to
South Africa, but are mirrored elsewhere in traditional societies in Africa, Asia and
Australia.  The debate in South Africa, however, will be whether these methods can
or should be extended to cases that did not previously fall under the umbrella of tradi-
tional courts, or whether the supremacy of contemporary western-style courts should
be maintained.  The point worth noting in this debate is that the majority of the popu-
lation of the country is rural and conceivably still wedded to tribal lore and culture.
Even where they reside and work in urban areas, the same appears to be true.
Traditional courts have a major advantage in comparison with other types of courts
in that their processes are substantially informal and less intimidating, with the
people who utilise these courts being more at ease in an environment that is not 
foreboding.
Keesing describes the process of settling cases out of court as informal litigation
which underlines the need to look for more subtle and undramatic legal processes
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the process and it is usually left to the parties to negotiate the consent order through
their legal representatives.  This is not the usual result of the typical trial process
which invariably ends in an arbitrary decision being made by a judge, with no
further input from the parties after their respective cases have closed.
3. Recognition and retention of traditional courts in South Africa
In the exercise of their jurisdiction as mediators, the courts of chiefs and headmen
are similar to the Lok Adalats and Panchayats of India.  The similarity is especially
evident in the procedures and mechanisms employed in the courts and the participa-
tion of the councillors of chiefs and headmen in resolving conflict within parochial
areas.  It was only in 1927 that these courts were officially recognised.2 Bennett
regards the aim of this enactment as the need to build up an African tradition
(Bennett 1991b:115).
The next stage of reorganisation of these traditional courts took place in 1986 conse-
quent upon the recommendations of the Hoexter Commission (1983). The following
reasons were advanced by the Hoexter Commission (1983:Part I, par 3.4.3.8) for
retaining only the courts of chiefs and headmen of all the structures of 1927:
Although in many respects the chiefs courts function imperfectly their
retention is widely supported both by Blacks and by experts in Black
customary law.  These courts represent at once an indigenous cultural insti-
tution and an important instrument of reconciliation.  For these reasons a
rural Black will often prefer to have his case heard by the chief s court.
The establishment of Commissioners courts requires some description and explana-
tion for the sake of completeness in the discourse on traditional conflict resolution.  A
negative factor in the existence of these courts (the presiding officers of which were
white) was that Africans were being subjected to a far lower standard of justice than
practised elsewhere (Bennett 1991b:81, note 11).  The Hoexter Commission
(1983:Part V, par 6.1) called for the scrapping of racially separate courts:
That inhabitants of the same country should purely on the grounds of race
be criminally prosecuted in separate courts for any offence whatever is, in
the Commission s view, by any civilised standard, unnecessary, humiliating
and repugnant.  The Commission is satisfied that with the exception of
courts of chiefs and headmen [emphasis added] the policy of separate
courts for Blacks is outmoded and obsolete.
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7. The chief as mediator and final arbiter
The role of the chief was not just restricted to participating in conflict resolution
mechanisms, but also to anticipate and, therefore, intercept conflicts.  An example of
activism by a tribal leader is given by Sansom in his illustration of a Zulu headman
applying a criterion of proximity in granting grazing rights (Sansom 1974:141).  In
making his decision in relation to a particular pasture the headman determines
whether the man s kraal is near enough to, or too far from, the coveted grazing land.
The Nguni tribesman is forced to pursue his subsistence activities within a zone
centred on his kraal (Sansom 1974:141).
Schapera studied the handling of civil and criminal wrongs according to Tswana law
and custom (Schapera 1955).  In the case of a civil wrong, it is expected that the
victim will first look to the wrongdoer for satisfaction by direct negotiation
(Schapera 1955:47).  Should this fail, then the matter proceeds to the local court, and
if necessary, through the hierarchy to the chief s court.  The matter is tried at the
instance only of the victim or the victim s representative.  A criminal wrong incurs
the intervention of a traditional court, not necessarily that of the chief which is at the
apex of the dispute resolution or adjudication structure.  A Tswana chief is also
provided with advice from his senior male relatives.  They intercede with the chief
in the event that a man feels aggrieved by some action or decision of the Chief
(Schapera 1955:76).  Schapera also notes that all matters of public concern are dealt
with finally before a general tribal assembly of the men (Schapera 1955:80).
8. Modern litigation and tribal courts
Abel (1991:83) has drawn attention to the incompatibility of tribal social structures
and modern courts:
The introduction of the latter into the former leads to a decline in tribal 
litigation .  We are constantly rediscovering multiplex, enduring, affective
relationships in economic life, in the extended family, within large institu-
tions, in residential groupings, even between criminals and their victims.
Tribal litigation is integrative; it preserves and even strengthens those rela-
tionships.  If courts are modernised, one forum for tribal litigation is
removed.  Furthermore, the mere availability of modern courts seems to
undermine tribal dispute processing elsewhere in the society.
Abel (1991:84) notes that in contemporary Africa there are three major deviations
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side by side with more formal legal systems (Keesing 1981:322).  The headmen or
chiefs who preside over traditional courts are generally charismatic and familiar with
the populace that use the courts, are revered to an extent that judges are not, are wont
to play an active role in the proceedings and are not shy to suggest mediation at
almost any point in the proceedings in matters susceptible to that form of resolution.
Contemporary courts that are western-orientated are mired in procedures and
processes that do not lend themselves to such activism on the part of presiding 
officers who may do so at the risk of entering the arena and thereafter being 
taken on appeal or review by any of the parties or a superior court intervening in the
proceedings.  In any event, the ethos of these courts is to deter such intervention by
judicial officers trained in a different school of precedents, rules of court, statutory
interpretation and similar devices designed to attempt justice between man and man.
This is not to say that traditional methods of conflict resolution, as they prevail in
traditional courts for example, are devoid of the devices referred to earlier.
5. The jurisdiction of the chiefs courts
The jurisdiction exercised by chiefs courts is strictly territorial and is confined to
persons resident within a chiefdom , regardless of their tribal affiliation (Bennett
1991b:67).  Jurisdiction is also automatically conferred by reason of the defendant
being resident within the area concerned.  Traditional courts, particularly chiefs
courts, enjoyed a junior status in relation to magistrates courts and matters could
be taken on appeal to the latter, even though they had not reached finality in the
chiefs courts.  Bennett points to the undesirability of this overlap in jurisdiction
which could lead to forum-shopping and actions being removed from a wrong
court to the correct forum, with consequent loss of time and money (Bennett
1991b:69-70).
6. Deficiencies in traditional conflict resolution processes
Criminal matters proceed in traditional courts without a tribesperson being afforded
any legal representation.  Bennett argues that in the face of such penalties that are
likely to be imposed such as banishment or dispossession of land, there ought to be
a right of representation although sound reasons exist for the exclusion of legal
practitioners from traditional courts.  One such reason is the aim to preserve proce-
dural informality and to ensure that neither litigant would be given an unfair
advantage by being allowed to engage counsel to argue the case (Bennett
1991b:80).
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within or between family groups .  In fact, the latter is the principal vehicle for
settling disputes outside the official courts (M nnig 1967:314).
In effect it becomes obvious that only the more serious and complicated cases are
referred to the official courts (M nnig 1967:315).  M nnig notes, however, that
serious efforts are made to settle disputes out of court and matters may be postponed
so that the parties involved can secure the assistance of yet more relatives to assist
them (M nnig 1967:316).
The Pedi have a highly evolved system of conflict resolution, and parties are
actively encouraged to resolve their differences without intervention from the chiefs
or their delegates through the medium of family processes as courts of first
instance .  The processing of the matters through the Pedi hierarchy of courts and
related structures takes place as a result of the failure of the conflict resolution
process at the lower levels.  However, the primary role assigned in Pedi society to
maintaining harmony is manifested in fresh attempts in the chief s court to drive the
disputants to reconsider resolving differences without intervention.
Another aspect of conflict resolution, the religious manifestation of expiation of
guilt, is reported as occurring among two tribes, the Sotho and the Tswana where
every sacrifice had to be preceded by a confession of possible strife between family
members or neglect of custom (Weekly Mail & Guardian 1994a:27).  According to
tribal custom, the religious aspect took a special turn towards reconciliation when a
special ceremony of reconciliation was necessary if a member had quarrelled with
the family head, before the ancestors could be approached (Weekly Mail &
Guardian 1994a:27).  Mkhize has referred to the position of ancestors in the context
of conflict resolution, noting that family conflicts had to be swiftly resolved lest
they incurred the anger of the ancestors and attracted illness or misfortune within the
family (Mkhize 1990:21).
10. The Pondo and mat associations
According to Kuckertz the institution of mat associations is one of the conflict reso-
lution mechanisms prevalent among the Pondo (Kuckerts 1990).  Mat associations
are similar to izithebe or hospitality groups which Hammond-Tooke had referred to
in his study of the Mpondomise (Hammond-Tooke 1975:52).  It is through such
hospitality groups or mat associations that the distribution of food and drink at
social gatherings is organised.
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from the ideal type of modern litigation:
First, there is a decline in the accessibility of the court to individual liti-
gants, and warning of a much more radical curtailment in the future, as
primary courts are thoroughly professionalized.  In modern society, where
much interaction occurs between strangers who are not bound together by
any relationship, individual disputants confronted with an increasingly
inaccessible tribunal will simply terminate the relationship — they will
lump it .  Second, there is growing dominance of the court by criminal
prosecution, and especially by administrative offenses, which renders it less
attractive to potential litigants.  Third, adjudication in modern courts,
whether civil or criminal, becomes increasingly superficial — a rubber-
stamping of decisions reached elsewhere.
All these factors are absent to a large extent within traditional courts and, instead of
replacing or usurping the jurisdiction of these courts, resources should be diverted
towards enhancing the visibility of traditional courts as a trusted conflict resolution
mechanism.  These courts are readily accessible, serve towards restoring and
binding the relationship between traditional people and are highly visible with a
transparent decision-making process in which there is community participation.
9. The Pedi and conflict resolution
M nnig notes that Pedi tribal law emphasises group relationships and rights rather
than those of the individual.  Stress is placed on restoring relationships as well as the
reconciliation of groups:
The court takes great pains to reconstruct the cause of any dispute, to show
individuals who are not accused how their actions may have given rise to
the complaint, and frequently advises the accused that he may have a
counter claim.  The court always enquires whether the disputing parties
have tried to come to a mutual settlement beforehand, and frequently refers
a case back to the families involved to attempt by private discussion to
resolve their dispute.  The accent is always on arbitration rather than on
punishment, and the legal institutions of the Pedi have the characteristics of
a number of agencies for arbitration on various levels.
(M nnig 1967:308)
Furthermore, the majority of disputes are resolved through the mediation process
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Proceedings in the chief s court are formal when compared to those of the preceding
court of a headman.  The emphasis is no longer on mediation and reconciliation, but
on the correlation between testimony proving culpability and the sanctions imposed
by the court.  This is the most important difference between the lower courts (which
proceed on the assumption of, or work for, the restoration of mutual trust) and the
chief s court (Kuckertz 1990:144-145).
Quite apart from the role of mediators in small-scale conflict resolution, such as
those within families or between neighbours, conflict resolution mechanisms
emanate substantially from courts of headmen and chiefs in all the traditional soci-
eties of South Africa.  These courts enjoy some formal structure in terms of their
method 
of operation albeit they frequently operate from backyards and beneath trees.  The
South African judicial system accorded formal recognition to these courts (South
African Law Reports 1960(3):490E (R v Dumezweni)).
It could be said that the geographical distance between the courts is equalled by the
gulf that widens between the parties as they progress towards these courts.  In the
process a social conflict is transformed into a legal case with a suprasocial
(abstract) correlation between an offence and its punishment (Kuckerts 1990:151).
As far as possible small-scale conflict should be resolved closer to home .  Once
the adjudicatory process fails at a local level, the progress of the conflict becomes
embroiled in legalities, the eradication of which will not necessarily leave the
parties at peace with one another.  This is accentuated by the growing distance
between the parties, on the one hand, and the adjudicators on the other.  There is not
the same degree of familiarity between the disputants and mediators at a more
parochial level, such as the homestead heads and mat leaders, as with the headmen
and chiefs.  Krige (1950) refers to a similar system of conflict resolution among 
the Zulu.
11. Cleansing and other forms of conflict resolution
A more recent example of cleansing and expiation involves the debacle following
upon a visit by President Mandela to Ulundi to meet with the King of the Zulus.
Supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the leader of which is Chief
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, demonstrated against the visit outside the palace of the king.
Chief Buthelezi is both a minister in the Government of National Unity and Prime
Minister to the Zulu King.  A news report states that Chief Buthelezi had offered the
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The mat leader is the first person whom a disputant approaches with his problem.
Cases are first discussed at the izithebe level.  Hammond-Tooke indicates, in cases
involving two such groups, that the members of the two hospitality groups would
meet and attempt to settle the matter between themselves.
Hammond-Tooke also states that most disputes were settled in the courts of
headmen (Hammond-Tooke 1975:172).  The lineage court endeavours to settle
matters between kinsmen in an effort to avoid washing its dirty linen in public, to
use the phrase employed by Hammond-Tooke (1975:173).  He also described an
unusual feature of this court in the use of ukuzidla.  This is a self-imposed fine and
is employed thus:
If a person realises that he is in the wrong, or it is apparent to him that his
fellow lineage members deem him so, he may impose a fine of a sheep, goat
or even a beast on himself to indicate his contrition and to wash away his
offence.  This ukuzidla is sometimes also resorted to in the headman s
court, constituting an admission of guilt.  It is known as imali yoku
zithandazelo (money of begging for mercy) and is an indication to the court
of the sincerity of repentance.  In a case where the guilty party imposes a
fine on himself that the members of the inkundla regard as inadequate, they
regard this as proof that he is not really sorry, and may increase the fine; on
the other hand, if he fines himself too heavily, they are likely to reduce it.
(Hammond-Tooke 1975:173)
It is clear that the izithebe are unable to compel a statement.  This power to compel
obedience was a preserve of the court of the headman to which the matter would
ordinarily proceed in the event that it remained unresolved (Hammond-Tooke
1975:53).  In the event that the person remains dissatisfied, one of the options avail-
able is to refer the problem to the court of the wardhead, thence to the chief.  This
accompanies a request to establish a separate mat association which, in effect,
secedes from that of the leader whose conduct is the subject matter of the complaint
(Kuckertz 1990:87).
The dissatisfaction is expressed publicly to the chief in a tactful manner (Kuckertz
1990:87-88).  What emerges is that the conflict is avoided by the subtle, diplomatic
use of language designed to achieve secession, with the reluctant approval of the
chief, who, at the same time, is faced with a fait accompli.  The chief, therefore, has
little option but to acquiesce in the announcement as, in all probability, it represents
the wishes of the majority of those affected.
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Referring to the African National Congress Bill of Rights and the Bill proposed by
the South African Law Commission in respect of the provisions relating to gender
equality, Bennett commented that enforcement of gender equality would involve a
complete overhaul of the present system of customary law (Bennett 1991a:26).
This would be anathema to the proponents of customary law and adherents to tribal
traditions in South Africa, especially in view of the far-reaching consequences it
would entail to giving women equal rights to property, powers of joint decision-
making, and freedom from physical assault (Bennett 1991a:26-27).  Whilst it would
be presumptuous of any person to prescribe a solution to the potential for conflict
between customary law and the modern jurisprudence of human rights, Bennett
(1991a:32) concludes that the 
most powerful argument in favour of sustaining customary law, and hence
allowing free pursuit of cultural rights, is that this law (provided it is modi-
fied to take account of prevailing sentiments) endorses current social
practice, and therefore rests on a foundation of popular acceptance .  The
present talk about human rights has an echo of the 1960s, the heady days of
law and development and law and modernisation , when it was believed
that customary law was primitive and backward and should be swept aside
to make way for a brave new legal order imported from the West.  The
failure of these schemes to take root and to transform the newly indepen-
dent African nations into images of their European and American
benefactors has bred a certain respect for the resilience of local cultures.
So there is yet the prospect that our indigenous systems of law and the accompanying
conflict resolution structures will survive the human rights legislative and judicial
onslaught.
Channock (1991:68-69) expounds upon what emerges as a problem on the part of
South African lawyers who will be forced to confront the existence of another
system of law alongside that in which they have been trained:
South African lawyers, the products of an authoritarian state and legal
system may have difficulties in rethinking their model of the legal world, in
which the state s law stands in an hierarchical relationship to a wide variety
of customs, and in which courts render authoritative decisions which have
far-reaching effects on behaviour.  Courts, as Galanter points out, deal with
only a small fraction of disputes, and most of these are settled by negotia-
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king two head of cattle as a self-imposed penalty for the demonstration by the IFP
supporters at the meeting of the two leaders (Weekly Mail & Guardian 1994c:2).
The report specifically alludes to a resolution of the matter along traditional lines
where if the monarch had accepted the cattle, both would have probably been
present at a cleansing  ceremony where the hatchet would have been buried
(Weekly Mail & Guardian 1994c:2).  It is obvious, therefore, that the status of 
the disputants is irrelevant to the traditional processes involved in the resolution of 
the conflict.
In a similar context Van der Vliet (1974:224) refers to family conflict resolution and
discusses the case of a parent being neglected:
A commonly used sanction, particularly in the hands of the peer group, is
mockery or ridicule, often in the form of chants or songs.  The threat of
ostracism is also a powerful force for conformity.  As in our society, bogeys
and threats of supernatural punishments are often resorted to in an attempt
to frighten a child into obedience.
Clearly these are not adjudicatory mechanisms at work in resolving conflict, but the
obvious end is the same, and that is to restore a balanced relationship and thus to
intercept conflict and discord.3
12. The impact of the Constitution
Though chapter 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No. 108
of 1996)4 provides for the recognition of traditional authorities and indigenous law,
reservations have been expressed about the future of traditional leaders and
customary and indigenous law in the light of chapter 3, relating to Fundamental
Rights.  Bennett (1993:37) anticipated these concerns and stated that
with growing political power, Africans are demanding the repatriation of
their culture from the province of western scholarship.  In summary, culture
is in the process of being rehabilitated.  This does not mean that a bill of
rights should be abandoned .  Specific issues, such as amelioration of the
status of women and children, may be addressed in a bill of rights without
implying that an entire cultural heritage is to be overthrown.  If the failures
of past legislative reforms in Africa teach us anything, it is that program-
matic and thus gradual change is more likely to succeed.
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invariably acted as spokesman for his councillors, who in turn sought to
uphold and reinforce the established norms of the tribe.
Sachs (1973:96) also describes the quintessential role of the chief in maintaining
harmonious relations between his charges thus:
(I)n this context the good chief was reckoned not by the terror he could
inspire or the magnanimity he could display, but by his skill in articulating
the sense of justice (just-ness) of a relatively homogeneous community,
which involved his applying universally accepted rules and precedents to
particular disputes in a manifestly appropriate way.
Sachs illustrates this point in his reference to Chief Albert Luthuli, once President of
the African National Congress as well as chief of his tribe at Groutville on the north
coast of KwaZulu-Natal.  Chief Luthuli derived great pleasure from trying cases,
and enjoyed both the debate and the reconciling of people at variance with each
other (Sachs 1973:115).
Methods of dispute and conflict resolution as extant in traditional courts of South
Africa do not slavishly follow precedent.  Indeed, it may even be argued, the failure
to follow precedent was a criticism of the methods of resolution employed indige-
nously.  However, those who utilise such courts do so out of choice in many cases,
and believe that they have more in common with the adjudicators and methods of
adjudication, in contrast to the prevailing judicial system.  In any event, it would be
expensive and a gross waste of time and resources to use the fine tuned dispute
resolution methods that prevail as alternatives to the conventional judicial system.
Those conventional methods are designed largely as alternatives to litigation in an
urban western context for complex cases where literally time means money .
14. People s courts and informal justice
This form of conflict resolution has emerged in relatively recent times.  People s
courts are not recognised by the government, but function mostly in urban areas,
sometimes under the aegis of civic organisations.  The creation of people s courts, a
feature of the previous decade, has been ascribed to a rejection of apartheid struc-
tures and an attempt to return to the precepts of African communitarianism: of
participation and consensus in all aspects of life as happened elsewhere in Africa at
the time of independence (Radipati 1993:25).  These courts are neither indigenous
nor are they traditional but are so deeply entrenched in the architecture of informal
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tion by parties using bargaining endowments given by law, as well as 
by culture.
13. Is there a place for traditional leaders in the new South Africa?
During multi-party constitutional negotiations in 1993, traditional leaders were not
slow to vent their concerns at a Bill of Rights that would undermine them.  A news-
paper report at the time stated that the traditionalists — kings, chiefs and headmen —
are worried that the proposed bill of rights, drawing heavily on western principles of
equality, will undermine their authority (Sunday Times 1993:18).  After listing a
series of burning questions , the report quotes a chief as stating that
there are serious problems if the law says all citizens, including chiefs,
kings and ordinary people, are equal in status.  There are also serious prob-
lems presented by the clause which says there shall be no discrimination
based on race, gender and creed.
(Sunday Times 1993:18)
The Interim Constitution has been so negotiated as to take account of the realities
that prevail in the many traditional communities which still exist in the mainly rural
areas of the country.  Therefore, it is not surprising that a role for traditional leaders
at both the national level and the provincial level has been enshrined in the Interim
Constitution (1993) and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996).
The role of traditional leaders will be reinforced by such structures as their courts
and cultural norms in terms of which their pre-eminent positions as mediators and
judges are acknowledged.  This recognition of traditional leaders in the Constitution
also amounts, to an extent, to their political rehabilitation.  In the past the State
President was entitled to appoint chiefs and headmen, a power which was often used
for political expediency.
Sachs (1973:96-97) provides a different perspective to the tribal administration of
justice and states that
in traditional African society every man was his own lawyer, and his 
neighbour s too, in the sense that litigation involved whole communities,
and all the local men could and did take part in forensic debate .  When
pre-judicial attempts to resolve disputes failed, the arguments could be
pressed to judgement before the chief, whose word was law; but the chief
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face of informal justice :
In an apparently typical case, a young man was charged with harassing, and
finally stabbing (but not too seriously) a young woman.  After consideration,
the young man was ordered to pay a fine, perform community service, and
undergo counselling.  A local civic leader described the court s role as
reconciliatory rather than enforcing an eye for an eye mentality .
The sentence imposed demonstrates an innovative approach which even courts in
the conventional judicial structure could do well to emulate.
The description of popular justice provided by Bennett (1991b:61) is instructive:
Popular justice is rooted in democratic principles, in particular trial by peers
in an elected tribunal.  So far as possible the tribunal is stripped of legal
formality and of any past association with oppressive state institutions.
15. Summary and conclusions
Some of the mechanisms for the resolution of conflict within the traditional societies
of South Africa have been explored.  Reference has been made particularly to the
processes in Pedi, Pondo and Tswana society, to name a few, which are representa-
tive of similar mechanisms for resolving conflict within the other traditional
groupings in the region.  This has also involved a comparison of western processes
with their African counterparts.  The role of traditional leaders has also been scruti-
nised as, to an extent, has been the case with informal justice machinery such as
people s courts.  Thus methods of conflict resolution ranging from the rudimentary
to the relatively sophisticated have been considered.
What is common to all these traditional societies is the desire to contain conflict and
therefore the potential for disruption.  The lifestyles of the members of these so-
cieties, be they members of a small band of Khoisan or a large tribe of Pondo, could
take a number of forms of disruption in the event that conflicts were allowed to
fester.  Thus, there would have been feuds and the secession of disenchanted
members, to name just two possibilities.  Family councils and traditional courts are
but the means employed by the traditional societies, as well as their increasingly
urbanised counterparts, to maintain and preserve harmony.  To this end, these struc-
tures have functioned fairly effectively, by and large.  In a rural or tribal setting, it
would not take much for a simple breakdown in individual relationships to quickly
25
justice in peri-urban areas as to warrant brief consideration.
Radipati has stated that indigenous dispute resolution institutions in urban areas
were Europeanised to the extent that there were two groups of Blacks, rural and
urban.  The former alone continued to enjoy access to their customary law and
institutions (Radipati 1993:24).  He has also suggested that urbanised Blacks,
through the virtual non-availability of such structures as well as their proximity to
formal law institutions, were serviced by informal dispute resolution structures such
as civic associations (Radipati 1993:24).
Hund and Kotu-Rammopo (see Radipati 1993:24) refer to Makgotla (people s courts):
 in the rural areas still governed by indigenous law and custom .  Cultural
movements also exist in the townships, and some of these have taken over as
part of their function peace-keeping and dispute-settlement activities.
(Bennett 1991b:91)
In a report entitled Return of the kangaroo court, a national newspaper records
instances of summary justice, which, according to one source, are the clearest
message that there is still a lack of confidence in the police, magistrates and the judi-
ciary (Weekly Mail & Guardian 1994b:12).  The same report also points to a sense
of frustration on the part of the communities involved with the provisions of the
Criminal Code as well as the Bill of Rights which have apparently led to a more lax
approach in matters of bail for those whom local communities perceive as notorious.
Also, there appears to be a reluctance of township dwellers to utilise formal struc-
tures and most township dwellers turn instead to unofficial agencies of justice such
as makgotla and also, perhaps increasingly, to other more drastic forms of self-help
and violence (Weekly Mail & Guardian 1994b:12).
Bennett (1991b:105) draws a distinction between people s courts and the makgotla
as follows:
Political allegiance aside, the makgotla never claimed validity or recognition
beyond the communities in which they operated, whereas, at least according to
the police, this was an implicit ideal of the people s courts.  Makgotla in conse-
quence tend to complement state structures rather than to challenge them.
Seekings (1992:194) uses the example of the court in Guguletu township in the
Cape Province (now Western Cape) which appears to illustrate the more acceptable
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face of informal justice :
In an apparently typical case, a young man was charged with harassing, and
finally stabbing (but not too seriously) a young woman.  After consideration,
the young man was ordered to pay a fine, perform community service, and
undergo counselling.  A local civic leader described the court s role as
reconciliatory rather than enforcing an eye for an eye mentality .
The sentence imposed demonstrates an innovative approach which even courts in
the conventional judicial structure could do well to emulate.
The description of popular justice provided by Bennett (1991b:61) is instructive:
Popular justice is rooted in democratic principles, in particular trial by peers
in an elected tribunal.  So far as possible the tribunal is stripped of legal
formality and of any past association with oppressive state institutions.
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develop into a feud or worse.  In an urban setting, people living cheek by jowl, as
well as the historical inequities of the apartheid era, would provide a fertile basis for
an assault or dispute or other like conduct to escalate out of control.  The existence
of traditional courts has historically intercepted such escalation of conflict and
demonstrated the need to harmonise relationships at a macro level because these, of
necessity, impact upon the greater whole.
The procedures of conflict resolution practised by the various indigenous societies
in South Africa have received a new impetus with the migration of rural people to
the urban areas and the establishment of the interim and the new constitution.  For
the first time in our constitutional history a role for traditional leaders in decision
making has been enshrined, although in an advisory capacity.
The conflict resolution procedures practised by our indigenous societies will be
influenced substantially by social developments in South Africa and will also infuse
the latter with ideas around which community conflict resolution centres can func-
tion in addition to other work that they render.
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